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Optimizely Hack: An Outside Tool Planted a Card Skimmer on 178 Websites. Is There One Like It on Your Checkout Page?

Short answer

Malicious code reached 178 websites through the Optimizely tool and stole card details from checkout forms. Check the outside tools on your store's checkout page and follow 6 steps this week.

Origami Team

Editorial Team · · 6 min read

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Optimizely Hack: An Outside Tool Planted a Card Skimmer on 178 Websites. Is There One Like It on Your Checkout Page?

On November 16, 2026 an attacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely's website experimentation service and added malicious code to the websites of 178 organizations, including Zoom, the BBC, HSBC and IKEA, without touching any of their servers. The code stole card details from checkout forms and swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses. The lesson for every Saudi online store: any outside tool you add to your site, from an ad pixel to a chat window, runs with your site's own permissions. What to do today: list the tools loaded on your checkout page, remove what you do not need, and have the card entered on your payment gateway's page rather than a form you built. If customer data was stolen, you have 72 hours to notify SDAIA, as we explained in our article on the notification deadline.

What exactly happened?

Optimizely is a platform companies use to test two versions of a page and change site content without a new release, through one line added to the site that loads code from Optimizely's servers. According to Optimizely's official statement on its status page, an unauthorized party exploited a flaw in the Web Experimentation account signup flow, impersonated users on targeted customer accounts and inserted malicious JavaScript into their projects. The company says it closed the flaw within 3 hours of detecting the activity, that fewer than 5% of its customers were affected, and that this was not a credentials breach and did not touch its other products.

Report URI spotted the attack. In its detailed report it checked 1,611 Optimizely files loaded on different websites and found the malicious code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organizations, and says the real number is probably higher. The first injection it saw was at 04:21 UTC on November 16, and the attacker rebuilt the code 26 times in a single day. The Record reported that the code appeared on 32 finance or banking websites.

Why didn't secure servers protect these sites?

Because the attack never went through their servers. The site tells the visitor's browser to load Optimizely's code, and the browser runs it with the same trust as the site's own code. When the code changes at the vendor, it changes on every site that loads it at the same moment. This is a supply-chain attack: they do not break into your store, they break into a tool your store trusts.

What the code did, according to Report URI and The Record:

  • Read card details from checkout forms the site built itself.
  • Swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses; about 7,000 dollars reached the attacker's wallets by the evening of November 16.
  • Stole cookies and screenshots.
  • Tried to exploit iPhones and iPads that had not been updated.

Does this concern you if you don't use Optimizely?

Yes. Optimizely is only one example. Open your store's checkout page and count the outside tools loaded on it: Snap, TikTok and Meta pixels, the analytics tool, the chat window, the reviews widget, and any code a marketing agency added two years ago that everyone has forgotten. Each one can read what the customer types on that same page if its vendor is breached.

The biggest difference is where the card is entered. The Record quoted a Black Duck expert saying this code reads forms a site builds itself, but not a payment processor's hosted frame. If the customer types the card number on a page or frame belonging to the payment gateway, the risk to the card is much lower. If they type it into a form your developer designed, every tool on the page can see it.

What protected only 24 sites?

Report URI checked the Content Security Policy (CSP) on the affected sites. A CSP is a list the site sends the browser naming who may run code or receive data. The result: 68 organizations had no policy at all, 50 had a policy that allowed both the code and the sending of stolen data, 17 allowed the code but blocked the data from leaving, and only 24 blocked the code entirely. The difference came from a policy that names code sources precisely instead of opening the door to everything.

This is not just opinion. The card data security standard PCI DSS requires, in requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1, that payment page scripts be authorized, checked for integrity and monitored for tampering. The PCI Security Standards Council published a dedicated guide to payment page security and preventing e-skimming on March 10, 2025, and the two requirements took effect after March 31, 2025.

Steps to take this week

  1. List the tools: ask your developer or platform provider for every outside script loaded on the cart and checkout pages, who added it and why.
  2. Remove what isn't needed: a checkout page needs neither a chat window nor an experimentation tool. Keep it to the minimum.
  3. Move card entry to the payment gateway: use your gateway's hosted payment page or frame instead of a custom form.
  4. Turn on a Content Security Policy: name the allowed sources for code and for sending data, and turn on reporting so you know when something tries to break it.
  5. Review who can edit: in every tool that injects code into your site, remove old accounts and turn on two-step verification.
  6. Prepare the notification plan: if customer data turns out to be stolen, Article 24 of the Implementing Regulation of the Personal Data Protection Law gives you 72 hours from when you learn of it to notify SDAIA.

The Origami view

Most Saudi stores we review load more tools on their checkout page than the owner knows about, added for an ad campaign or a passing test and then left in place. The Optimizely incident shows that a trusted tool today can become a back door tomorrow without anything changing in your store.

We are not asking you to give up marketing tools, only to keep them away from the checkout page. A clean checkout page, card entry at the gateway and a tight content policy make the next vendor breach the vendor's problem rather than your customers'. If you want your checkout page reviewed, you can contact the Origami team.

The bottom line

The attack lasted only hours, yet it hit 178 organizations because one piece of code was loaded on all their sites. List the tools on your checkout page today, remove the extras, have the card entered at the payment gateway and turn on a Content Security Policy. If you are an Optimizely customer, review the Project JavaScript field in your project and its change history.

  • #Optimizely Hack
  • #Card Skimming
  • #Online Store Security
  • #Checkout Page
  • #Business Cybersecurity

Frequently asked questions

Were Saudi stores affected by the Optimizely hack?

The published lists name global organizations such as Zoom, the BBC and HSBC, and Optimizely has not named its customers. If your store uses Web Experimentation, the company has contacted every customer of that service directly; also check the Project JavaScript field and its change history yourself.

I don't use Optimizely. Am I safe?

Not necessarily. Any outside tool on your checkout page, such as an ad pixel or a chat window, can be abused the same way if its vendor is breached. List those tools and remove the ones the checkout page does not need.

How do I protect my customers' card details from this kind of attack?

Have customers enter their card on a page or frame hosted by your payment gateway rather than a form you built, keep the checkout page to a minimum of tools, and turn on a Content Security Policy, which blocked the code on 24 of the affected sites.

What do I do if I find my customers' data was stolen?

Remove the infected code immediately, record the affected pages and time window, then notify SDAIA within 72 hours of learning of it under Article 24 of the Personal Data Protection Law's Implementing Regulation, and inform affected customers without undue delay.

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